



University of Juba
Centre for Peace and Development Studies



Youth Dialogue on Confidence and State-Building

Pre-assessment field research, 2011

Findings and analysis

Juba and Helsinki, Feb - March 2012



***Youth Dialogue on
Confidence and State-Building***

in South Sudan

Findings and analysis of the pre-assessment field research 2011

Edited by: Philippe Taflinski

About the project partners

The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is a Finnish, non-governmental organization that works to resolve conflict and build sustainable peace. CMI was founded in 2000 by its chairman, Peace Nobel Laureate Martti Ahtisaari and is based in Helsinki, Finland. CMI intervenes worldwide in two domains: First, with regard to mediation and dialogue CMI is mediating conflicts, facilitating dialogue processes and providing direct support to mediation processes. Secondly, CMI does capacity building by strengthening the conflict resolution and peacebuilding capacity of conflict parties, international and regional organizations, governments and civil society.

The University of Juba, Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS), was established in 1997 for the promotion of philosophies that aim at integrating humanitarian, conflict and peace studies with other relevant academic programmes. The centre also acts as an academic research entity in the university of Juba. The goal of the centre is threefold: First, to conduct research on social, cultural, humanitarian, economic and political aspects of Southern Sudan. Secondly, to promote research on conflict and post conflict management leading to post-graduate diploma and Master's degrees. Finally, the centre is conducting symposia, colloquial, workshops and conferences on conflict and development.

The Organization for Nonviolence And Development (ONAD) was founded in 1994 in Khartoum at the peak of civil war. It started as an initiative of South Sudanese students among internally displaced persons. When the CPA was signed in 2005, the organization extended its work to South Sudan and re-registered in 2006 with the Government of South Sudan in Juba. On 9 November 2011 the organization changed its name from SONAD to ONAD, by dropping Sudanese, as reference to Sudan is no longer appropriate for a national organization operating in our new independent country – South Sudan. ONAD works for a "nonviolent, peaceful and democratic" society and operates in the Greater Equatoria, Jonglei and Unity States. ONAD offers training and consultancy in but not limited to: Nonviolence and peace building (NPB); Governance and civic education (GCE); Community empowerment and gender (CEG); Internal organizational development (IOD) of ONAD.

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Furthermore, we would like to thank the various actors who facilitated the research and contributed greatly, notably government interlocutors such as the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (both on national and state level), Governors, Members of State Assemblies as well as representatives of the Ministries of Social Development (or equivalent) in the states.

In addition, we are thankful for the input provided by representatives of the international community who also supported the researchers, notably interlocutors from PACT Sudan, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and UNMISS Civil Affairs officers in various locations. Their input was very helpful to understand conflict dynamics within the states as well as the way youth are organised in the country.

CMI and its Southsudanese partners would also like to express their gratitude to the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who fund this youth dialogue project.

List of Acronyms

CAR	Central African Republic
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CPDS	Centre for Peace and Development Studies (University of Juba)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NBEG	Northern Bahr el Ghazal
NCP	National Congress Party
NDI	National Democratic Institute
ONAD	Organization for Nonviolence and Development
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WBEG	Western Bahr el Ghazal

Introduction

The project on “Youth Dialogue on Confidence and State-building” is an initiative in which the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is partnering with the University of Juba Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) as well as the Organization for Nonviolence and Development (ONAD). The project will contribute to the peaceful reformation of South Sudan’s statehood given the new reality of independence. This is to be achieved through a bottom-up process by providing a platform for confidence and state-building dialogue among youth leaders, broadly understood as young “influencers”. The dialogue workshops will identify common values and interests of the selected youth and cover issues identified as relevant by them to nation building and conflict resolution. The project will aim at: a) building confidence between and among the youth influencers; and b) deepening the participation and ownership of the youth influencers over shaping the future of South Sudan. The goal of the project is to feed the views of the youth influencers into key political processes in South Sudan, such as the constitution drafting and parliamentary sessions at state and national levels.

Preliminary field research was conducted by two joint CMI-CPDS teams in October and November 2011, and while the target of the exercise was to visit all 10 states of South Sudan, insecurity prevented the researchers to travel to Unity State at that time, but the trip will be conducted in 2012 (security situation permitting). Considering the design of the dialogue process, the purpose of these field trips was fourfold: a) to identify potential participants; b) to identify the issues related to challenges and conflicts to inform agenda-setting for the workshops; c) to establish contacts with government officials and local actors and introduce them to our activities and d) to draw up a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) baseline assessment.

In March 2012, CMI, CPDS and ONAD conducted a “test group workshop” in Juba with 17 individuals selected from the interviewed youth¹. The findings of the pre-assessment field research were discussed with them, which greatly improved our understanding of the local dynamics. This report has therefore been updated with further insights from this workshop where appropriate.

To present the findings, a first part of this analysis document will lay out the concepts involved as well as the methodology used for the field research, followed by an outline of the nature of youth organization across South Sudan as well as a characterization of the individuals that the teams interviewed. Two further chapters will elaborate on the findings regarding the challenges and the incidents of violence that interviewees mentioned, the views of youth on how these issues affect their lives and what can be done about them. Finally, based on quantitative data gathered throughout the interviews, a last chapter is drawing up a baseline assessment for the M&E needs of this project.

It needs to be emphasised that this report is an analysis regarding the background of and responses provided by the 108 interviewed youth. This selection, as will be shown, for now focused on urban youth from state capitals, and the project partners are aware of the plethora of other viewpoints of youth from, *inter alia*, more rural areas, who are more likely to be affected by or involved in conflicts and probably have slightly different sets of concerns. The interviewees represent a quite well educated group with a high capability of reflection, but they of course do not represent all youth of South Sudan, nor do they represent the Southsudanese society at large. Therefore the findings presented in the following chapters need to be taken “as they are”, i.e. as analysis of views and characteristics of 108 interviewees, but neither as an

¹ The aims of this workshop were: 1) Identification of eight youth participants that will be part of the dialogue core group; 2) Receive feedback from the youth on the findings of the field research; 3) Test and train the use of video for facilitation purposes and 4) Monitoring and evaluation of the project.

opinion polling exercise nor as accurate statistics for South Sudan. This report does not aspire to generalise the findings for the entire South Sudanese society, nor does it aim at providing a thorough analysis of the situation. Rather, the insights presented here aim to improve the understanding of how issues and challenges are perceived by these interviewed youth themselves. The findings will also inform the design of the dialogue process and help fine-tune the selection of the members of the core group.

1. Concepts and research methodology

a) The concept of state-building

The following insights from a previous event on state-building in Africa organized by CMI and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)² aim at furthering the understanding of state-building as conceptualized in this project. According to Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman of CMI and Peace Nobel Laureate, effective and legitimate states are shaped and sustained by an enduring relationship with the particular society that they govern. When state-building strategies prioritize inclusiveness, domestic ownership, flexibility, and strong communication between actors, they best promote state resilience. Above all, building resilient states requires building resilient societies. In this perspective, state-building addresses root causes of state fragility, and it is a process that should be fundamentally driven by local actors. It is an endogenous process as enduring states are legitimated by their citizens before the international community, and trust in government is perhaps the most important ingredient for state legitimacy. Trust in government can be created by giving people the tools to be architects of their own future.³

Kelsi Stine (CMI) sees state-building as a process that involves developing a system of governance that is operationally functional and responsive to the needs of the citizens of the state. Negotiating a state-society relationship is at the core of the process as it will help reaching a social contract. The resulting social contract will in turn lay the foundation for establishing state legitimacy by ensuring that governing institutions are shaped by the needs and expectations of citizen.⁴

According to Dr. Rahul Chandran from New York University, state-building is a political process that is at the core of state formation. It is the process of how to balance what citizens expect from the state and what the state expects from its citizens and the state's capacity to deliver on that promise. It is the political process that allows a state to have a dialogue with its citizens and through this dialogue the state clarifies the relationship between the expectations and its abilities.⁵

Considering and building upon these elements, the project defines state-building as follows:

State-building is an inclusive process which aims at negotiating state-society relationships with the perspective to reach a social contract, which will lay the foundation for establishing state legitimacy by ensuring that governing institutions are shaped by the needs and expectations of the state's citizens. It is an inherently indigenous process that establishes dialogue between the state and its citizens and thereby creates trust in government, which ultimately addresses the root causes of state fragility.

² Seminar organized by CMI and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on 19 February 2009 in Brussels, Belgium on the theme: *An African Perspective on State-Building – Institutional Capabilities and Legitimacy of the State*.

³ Martti Ahtisaari, in CMI (2009). *An African Perspective on State-Building – Institutional Capabilities and Legitimacy of the State*. pp. 13-16.

⁴ Kelsi Stine, in CMI (2009). *ibid.* pp. 8-9.

⁵ Dr Rahul Chandran, in CMI (2009). *ibid.* pp. 21-23.

Given this state-building perspective, in a concrete dialogue approach the project aims at contributing to the establishment of attitudes, mechanisms and institutions that are capable of resolving differences without recourse to violence, or the threat of the use of violence. It is a long-term perspective that does not promise quick fixes, but seeks to achieve systemic changes.

b) Defining conflict

A working definition of conflict for this project is “the prevention of basic human needs from being met”. For the purpose of the field research this broad definition was broken down into “violent conflicts” and other kinds of “challenges”. The research teams do however recognize that these two may well be overlapping, yet for research purposes this distinction proved to yield better insights.

c) Defining “youth leaders”

The definition of “youth leaders” in this project is rather broad and flexible, allowing inclusion of youth who are active and influential in society, which can refer to youth committing their time in more structured groups like youth associations or civil society organizations, Student Youth Unions, Church or Islamic youth. These youth are easily to be found in state capitals, which is where initial interviews took place in October and November 2011. However, for the further development and fine-tuning of the project the more rural dimension will also be included by extending the definition to young influencers from other more traditional, less institutionalized societal groups, including from conflict-affected areas. For the time being the present report will draw on the information gathered by the teams during this first research phase.

The project team had initially agreed on the criteria listed below for selection of participants, which guided the choice of interviewees during the pre-assessment research phase⁶.

⁶ One lesson drawn from the field research was that the dialogue process needs to be adapted to include youth from rural areas as well, therefore the criteria for the final selection of members for the dialogue platform will have to be revisited in order to encompass this dimension as well.

#	Type of criteria	Explanation
1	Gender balance	Leading positions in the Southsudanese society are mostly occupied by men, therefore the project partners found it important to ensure as balanced a representation of women as possible.
2	Age: 16-40	This broad age-spectrum has been suggested to define "youth", but teams also agreed on making sure, once getting to selecting participants, that individuals will constitute a homogeneous age-group which is conducive to a positive group atmosphere.
3	Willingness to engage with others	This is a self-explaining criterion indispensable for participating in such kind of dialogue.
4	Diaspora/Returnees from the north	Rather than being a criterion for selection, enquiring about this is needed in order to understand the background of the interviewees.
5	Youth leaders	This refers to the interviewee's status in society, whether they are actively engaging with youth and society, in order to gauge their level of influence.
6	Language	Knowledge of languages informs whether interpretation will be required during the dialogue process.
7	Ability to represent and not to confiscate	Allowing everyone to speak is a trait of character required for positive group discussions.
8	Ethnicity	Knowledge of the ethnic background helps guarantee a reflection of the diversity of South Sudan once it comes to selection of participants.
9	Political background	Enquiring about the political background of participants helps to warrant that diversity is respected in this regard, too.
10	Literacy: ability to read and write	This criterion was agreed upon to make sure group exchanges are effective and communication smooth.
11	Commitment: a long term project	Making sure to select participants who can more or less commit to participating in a two-year project is important for the continuity of this project.
12	Some participants: interest in videotaping	Video will be used in this project as a tool for facilitation, and the project team will probably need assistance by youth for some dialogue workshops. Therefore the aim was to identify youth with videotaping experience.

d) *Field research methodology*

In terms of methodology, the teams followed the same approach in each of the states: Usually one and a half days were dedicated to introducing government actors to the research activities and trying to figure out how the youth are organized in the respective state. Following this, during two or three days interviews were conducted with youth leaders. In this light, when arriving at the state capitals the teams first contacted the State-level Peace Coordinators of the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission for a first exchange on the project and on the situation in the State in terms of youth organization but also on conflicts dynamics. Subsequently the Peace Coordinators most of the time established contact with Governors or Deputy Governors and also facilitated the exchange with the Ministries responsible for youth (i.e. the Ministries for Social Development, Directorate of Youth, or equivalent). These meetings proved indeed valuable in understanding how the youth were organized and helped establish first contacts with individuals. International actors present in the field (NDI, UNMISS Civil Affairs, PACT Sudan) and representatives of the Church and the Islamic community also shared their knowledge on the situation in the ground and provided further contacts.

Following these official visits and recognition exercise of the situation in the state, the teams started conducting interviews with youth with whom contact could be established. The methodology of conducting the interviews is reflected in the questionnaire (see Annex 1): A first set of questions recorded contact and background information of the individuals, whereas a second and third section focused on the interviewees' views on the challenges and conflicts in South Sudan, their impact on their lives as well as on the youth's views on how to address these. These two sections are particularly important for the further

planning for the dialogue processes as the answers to the questions will help set the agenda for the discussions and to design the actual workshops, to prioritize and to sequence issues. Chapters two and three of this analysis will shed light on the answers to the questions on challenges and conflicts.

A further set of questions aimed at finding out more about the interviewees' attitudes towards the approach of our project, enquiring about their views on the usefulness of dialogue among youth and with politicians on the conflicts and challenges the new country is facing. These questions aimed at finding out whether the interviewee would be suitable for participating in such a process, but in practice never did any participant reply in the negative and the questions provoked less controversial reactions than initially assumed. According to South Sudanese colleagues no one would ever say no to such questions, as every interviewee would be interested in participating in this project. This is probably even more valid given the teams were interviewing youth who were already identified as active youth leaders, and by this nature inclined to be interested in participating in youth activities. This being said, these questions did indeed prompt the interviewees' reflection on our dialogue process, helped the team identify further youth contacts and find out whether the interviewee had experience with videotaping, which is needed for implementing the project's media component.

A last batch of questions was designed to respond to the M&E needs of the project: in order to be able to draw up a baseline assessment, the researchers enquired about the youth's perceptions on the conflict dynamics within their particular state and in South Sudan. This was done in a multiple-choice format in order to collect quantitative data which can be used for statistical analysis. More concretely, the teams were asking interviewees to indicate their personal rating to questions such as the level of violence among the youth, the trust between youth and government (local and national levels), the level of participation of youth in political processes, etc.

2. A point on youth organization across South Sudan

The research teams realized during their field visits that youth are organized very differently from state to state. While this chapter does not aspire to provide an exhaustive overview of youth organization in South Sudan, it will nevertheless sketch out noteworthy commonalities and differences.

In general, formal youth associations are linked to the state-level "Ministry for Social Development"⁷ through the Directorate for Youth. Youth Associations include state-level youth, county-level youth associations and sometimes so-called "Greater". In the latter, the youth from several counties are formally joined to form an additional layer of youth structure, e.g. the Greater Pibor youth covering the Boma and Pochalla counties in Jonglei State. Youth Associations might be registered with the Ministry for Social Development but sometimes are not, and oftentimes there are links between youth associations at the different levels.

While in most states there are state-wide youth associations as overarching umbrella linking the county-level youth organizations (e.g. Lakes State Youth Union), some states do not possess such kind of a structure, or used to have in the past but these had been politicized during the 2010 elections by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), resulting in the cessation of activities by the association (e.g. in Western Bahr el Ghazal). In addition to this, in Jonglei State county-level youth associations maintain liaison

⁷ Or a ministry with a different name either capturing more competencies or focusing on youth only, e.g. a specific Ministry for Youth and Sports.

offices in the state capitals, representing the county youth at state-level but also liaising closely with other youth associations (e.g. with umbrella structures), a coordination mechanism not found in other states.

In some states the teams found, apart from the youth associations at county and state-levels, very active Civil Society Organizations (CSO) focusing on youth (e.g. Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria States), at times bearing very particular traits: In Western Equatoria State, a CSO was found that was headed by an individual active with the Arrow Boys; naturally, the Arrow Boys also constitute a particular grouping of young men whose purpose is to fight the Lord's Resistance Army which is causing insecurity in Western Equatoria State. Then again, in other states there appears to be very little organization in terms of youth CSOs and youth associations, while the governor is being advised by a dedicated advisor for youth (e.g. Western Bahr el Ghazal).

Apart from the youth CSOs and associations, other strata of the South Sudanese society include youth structures, for instance the religious groups. The churches present in South Sudan (incl. Catholic, Episcopal and Pentecostal Churches) are deeply entrenched in the society and generally also run youth groups. In addition, some states are home to a high number of Muslim believers and the Islamic Councils in those states (e.g. Western Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile State) are equally running youth activities. Apart from the religious youth, students also organize themselves, and not only in the four states that are hosting the Southsudanese Universities⁸ can a plethora of student unions be found, but also in other states did the researchers meet student associations, sometimes structured along tribal lines. Furthermore, the teams came across scout groups in some states, but it seems their aims vary greatly and there are salient differences from one group to another: in Eastern Equatoria, the scouts seem to follow more pacific goals, whereas in Lakes State they seemed to have rather militaristic leanings.

On a more regional and national level, organization of youth also varies greatly: The Bahr el Ghazal area⁹ has recently witnessed the creation of the "Greater Bahr el Ghazal Youth Association" following the Bahr el Ghazal Youth Conference on 24-27 November 2011 in Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal. There have been reports and claims that the other regions (Equatoria and Upper Nile) might follow¹⁰, while lacking this additional layer of organization for the time being. In addition, diverse organisms seek to unify youth at national level: The organization GEBU is working on fostering links between regional youth, and the Youth Parliament in Juba is also drawing in youth from across South Sudan. An additional noteworthy finding concerns youth activity in Juba: the team identified youth who are following the proceedings in the National Assembly as youth observers.

On the more traditional societal level, particular roles for youth are foreseen in some Southsudanese tribes: the Monyemiji in some Eastern Equatorian tribes (e.g. Lopit and Lotuko), bear the particular assignment of protecting the communities. The Monyemiji are the ruling youth age groups in their communities and they assume the right of membership through initiations. Their primary role is to provide security, look into livelihood issues (for instance in times of drought), consult and petition the rain maker, and handle all social issues of their communities. There are normally four groupings of different age groups for both boys and girls but each group must be made up of age mates. In some communities the ruling period of Monyemiji are between 20 to 23 years while other communities have a specific term limit of 12 years before yet another group is initiated. Monyemiji from one village are developing a network with other neighbouring

⁸ i.e. University of Juba in Central Equatoria, Upper Nile University in Malakal, Bahr el Ghazal University in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Dr John Garang Memorial University of Science and Technology in Bor, Jonglei State.

⁹ This includes Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes States.

¹⁰ The team was informed that there would soon be a Greater Equatoria youth conference.

villages as a way to bolster the security situation in that locality, while in other tribes youth are responsible of keeping the cattle.

3. Characteristics of the interviewees

In total, the teams interviewed 108 individuals representing 27 different tribal groups (irrespective of sub tribes e.g. of Dinka or Nuer). The aim was to interview 10-15 individuals per state, and the concrete reachability of the youth in the different states obviously had an impact on the numbers. Nevertheless, the minimum target of 10 interviewees per state was met, as shown in the table.

This chapter aims to provide background information on these youth that were interviewed, their common characteristics and salient differences across the states.

Total number of interviewees per state:	
Western Bahr El Ghazal	12
Lakes State	11
Warrap State	10
Eastern Equatoria	10
Central Equatoria	10
Western Equatoria	15
Jonglei State	12
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	15
Upper Nile State	13
Total:	108


a) Age

The age of the interviewed youth ranged from 17 to 39 years, although in some instances individuals in leadership positions of youth organizations were even older. However, to make sure at an early stage to be able to draw from a selection of youth with a homogeneous age-group the teams decided to look further. At times however conversations with these individuals helped gain a better understanding of the situation in the state with regard to youth, youth involvement and views on challenges that the youth face.

b) Level of education

This summary chart shows that the great majority of interviewees acquired secondary or higher education, and actually a minor percentage of interviewees in Warrap State had obtained primary education only (i.e. one individual).


The disaggregated chart below suggests that the states home to the four universities in South Sudan included the highest percentage of interviewees who received (or were in the course of receiving) higher education: Western Bahr el Ghazal (60%), Central Equatoria (80%), Upper Nile State (85%) and Jonglei State (75%)¹¹. The general trend of the interviewed youth leaders having obtained a good level of education is interesting in the South Sudanese context, where the overall literacy rate for the over 15 year old population was at 27% in 2009¹². As a later section will show, an explanation for this could be the fact that most interviewees were also part of the diaspora or recently returned from the north. Escaping the war to Khartoum or to surrounding countries brought better education opportunities and possibly exposed the individuals to more options for free-time activities, a heritage which might have had



¹¹ The Universities include the Bahr el Ghazal University, Juba University, Upper Nile University and the Dr John Garang Memorial University of Science and Technology in Bor, Jonglei State.

¹² South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2009). *Key Indicators for South Sudan*. Retrieved April 2012, from: http://ssnbs.org/storage/key-indicators-for-southern-sudan/Key%20Indicators_A5_final.pdf.

an impact on their choice for societal engagement when returning to South Sudan. Youth participants of the project workshop in March 2012 also saw a correlation between the level of education and societal engagement, some commenting that “those who are active are the intellectuals”¹³.




c) Gender distribution

As noted earlier on, one dimension that the team aimed to achieve for the selection of participants is a balance in terms of gender. The chart below strikingly confirms that South Sudan is a male-dominated society, with only 20% of all interviewees across the nine states being female: Most leadership positions in youth groups and associations are occupied by men, few women youth leaders were to be found during the field research and indeed, the teams had to specifically ask for active female youth. As shown, the highest percentage of female interviewees was in Central Equatoria (40%), versus 10% or even slightly less in the states of Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap.

In South Sudan, “women groups” can be found in many urban settings, and it seems that this is the place where women are accepted to be organizing themselves. Low female presence in leading strata of the society might also be related to an attitude for women to stay at home and take care of family business. For girls to receive education is in some areas seen as “spoiling” them, according to some female interviewees. In this reasoning, “spoiling” means loss of economic value: the bride price will be lower the higher the girl’s level of education. However, this can certainly not be claimed to be a view held consistently across South Sudan, as in some tribes the dowry is increasing with the level of education. Another explanation for limited female representation among the interviewed youth was given by participants in the project workshop in March 2012, stating that “as soon as women are married they consider themselves as mothers or elders, but not as youth anymore”. As seen beforehand, societal engagement was also considered being linked to the level of education, which might all the more so be relevant here given a lower level of education for women than for men with the literacy rate for men being at 40% and for women at 16% in 2009¹⁴.

¹³ Participant of CMI-ONAD-CPDS workshop, 13-15 March 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

¹⁴ South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2009). *Key Indicators for South Sudan*. Retrieved April 2012, from: http://ssnbs.org/storage/key-indicators-for-southern-sudan/Key%20Indicators_A5_final.pdf.



d) Political allegiances

In general, many respondents claimed to be members of the SPLM, totalling 44% of all interviewees across the nine states. In more detail, the chart below suggests that the highest percentage of those interviewees responding they were members of SPLM was found in Warrap State (70%) followed by Northern Bahr el Ghazal (67%) and Lakes State (64%). In contrast, the lowest percentage of interviewees claiming to be member of SPLM was found in Western Bahr el Ghazal (8%), Central Equatoria (20%) as well as Eastern Equatoria (30%).

The question of allegiance to the party in power is a complex one: some interviewees were indeed active members of SPLM, while others did not take the question as a query concerning real membership with the SPLM but seemed to indicate their mere support to this party by replying in the affirmative, or understanding this question as relating to their voting preferences. SPLM was the only South Sudanese party to the CPA negotiations and implemented the milestones of the agreement such as the elections of 2010, the referendum of 2011 and by extension led South Sudan to independence. This might be feeding into broad support to the party in power and indeed, participants of the project workshop in March 2012 confirmed that “the struggle was with the SPLM, and by virtue of this we are all members of SPLM”¹⁵. Strong support for the leading party might therefore be considered a legacy of the liberation struggle that was led by the SPLA/M. Youth also confirmed that belonging to SPLM was part of being a southerner, as “the enemy was the NCP, so as southerner I must be SPLM”¹⁶. In addition, youth participants noted that the concept of a *party* was probably not fully understood by the respondents¹⁷.

Finally, suspicion towards this question cannot be entirely excluded, despite the teams’ explanation of the rationale of these interviews: the respondents might have been doubtful where the information would go, which may have prompted a testimony of allegiance to SPLM.


On the other hand, if this question is taken as indication of support to the ruling party (be it active or not), a higher percentage was found in Lakes and Warrap States. Regarding the low percentage of affiliation with

¹⁵ Participant of CMI-ONAD-CPDS workshop, 13-15 March 2012, Juba, South Sudan.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.


the SPLM in other states, its local performance has probably played a role and influenced respondent's views regarding their support to the ruling party.



e) Diaspora and returnee

This chart ascertains that the great majority of the interviewees has a diaspora background (55%), and nearly one fifth returned from the north (19%).

A closer look at the chart below shows that most respondents with diaspora background were found in Eastern Equatoria (100%), Jonglei (90%) and Lakes States (80%), the lowest values being found in Western Bahr el Ghazal (17%) as well as in the states of Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Central Equatoria (each approximating 40%).




Interestingly, while the percentage of interviewees with diaspora background is lowest in Western Bahr el Ghazal, this state bears the highest proportion (58%) of interviewees who returned from northern Sudan, followed by Upper Nile State (46%). Both Upper Nile and Western Bahr el Ghazal states share a border with Sudan and more respondents were found to be "Arabic pattern"¹⁸. The Muslim community is quite present in these two states as well, therefore culturally speaking there also seems to be more of proximity with the north than in other states. This might explain the higher percentage of respondents having returned from the north in these states, as their cultural allegiance - and probably sheer geographical proximity - might have prompted them to migrate to Khartoum during the war rather than to East Africa. A possibility could have been to migrate to Central African Republic (CAR) but Khartoum seems to have been the nearest choice, in addition to the aforementioned cultural similarities this might also have been due to language barriers (CAR being French speaking).

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that none of the respondents in Central and Western Equatoria states were returnees from the north but a notable percentage had a diaspora background (Central Equatoria 40% and Western Equatoria 47%). In general one might be tempted to apply the reverse logic used for

¹⁸ "Arabic pattern" refers to a socialization in the Arabic culture and language of Sudan compared to East African cultural allegiance.

states close to Sudan, i.e. those who stayed in the north during the war would prefer to settle in a culturally closer environment upon return and those who were from Central and Western Equatoria were more likely to migrate to East Africa for refuge, which would also explain the percentage for Eastern Equatoria (100% had a diaspora background). However, given that for Central Equatoria interviews were conducted in Juba, it is surprising to see no respondents at all in the capital of the new country having stayed in the north during the war.

Finally, some youth explained they had been living both in Khartoum as well as in East Africa, therefore qualifying for both categories of “returnee” and “diaspora”. However, the numbers are rather small (5 of the total 108 interviewees), with one individual in each of the following states: Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile. Participants of the project workshop in March 2012 explained that some individuals went to the north first, but due to bad living condition subsequently migrated to East Africa.



f) Overall discussion

The total 108 interviewees of an age range of 17 to 39 years represent 27 different tribal groups, which is quite reflective of the ethnic diversity across South Sudan. More than half of them have a diaspora background (55%), and nearly one fifth returned from the north (19%) after the civil war. Despite the team’s efforts to reach out to female youth only 20% of the interviewed were women, which exhibits that leadership positions in youth groups and associations are quite male dominated.

99% of the interviewees acquired either secondary or higher education, although general statistics for South Sudan point out that only 27% of the South Sudanese over the age of 15 are literate¹⁹, suggesting that the interviewees occupy a rather privileged position in society. The majority of the interviewees were either part of the diaspora or sought refuge in the north during the war, which contributed to the high level of literacy among the respondents.

In general, a great percentage of the interviewees claimed to be members of the SPLM (44%), although this bears some complexities. It was the teams’ impression that the enquiry about political allegiance was not only understood in terms of concrete and active membership with the SPLM but also as support to the

¹⁹ See, for instance, South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2009). *Key Indicators for South Sudan*. Retrieved April 2012, from: http://ssnbs.org/storage/key-indicators-for-southern-sudan/Key%20Indicators_A5_final.pdf.

party in power or as the respondents' voting preferences. SPLM being the dominant southern party in the CPA, the elections, the referendum and by extension independence might be feeding into broad support to the party in power.

In sum, the interviewees represent rather privileged youth from the urban centres, corresponding to categories b) and c) of a youth classification provided by several interlocutors in the field:

- a) Those individuals who remained within southern Sudan during the war (including both those who fought and those who did not)
- b) Those who went to the north during the war
- c) Those who were in the diaspora in east Africa (including Kenya, Uganda but also Ethiopia), and
- d) Those who were in the diaspora in the western world²⁰.

Coupled with the ethnic diversity and intertribal differences this suggests very complex and diverse identity dynamics among the Southsudanese society in general and for the youth in particular. It also suggests that the background of these youth makes them more prone to getting actively involved with their peers and society.

4. Views on incidents of violence

a) Conflict trends

This section will attempt to give an overview of the general trends of conflicts in South Sudan as described by the youth in their various responses and how the violence or threats of violence affect the ability of Southsudanese to fulfil their aspirations. The section will further put forward the views of the youth on possible action that can be undertaken to ending the cycle of violence and on the way forward.

The violent conflicts in South Sudan vary from state to state, yet common trends exist and conflict types can be established, most of which are being carried out by youth. The majority of the youth mentioned cattle raiding, girl elopement, child and women abduction, armed conflicts, conflicts over grazing land and water points among the pastoralist, as well as disputes over borders or land. The following typology will sketch the conflict patterns, their effects and the actors involved.

- I. **Cattle raiding:** This is being practiced in almost all the states in South Sudan. The act to raid cattle is conducted in an organized way involving clans, groups of people with common aspirations and at times alliances are being formed to plan and conduct such vicious raids. Small arms are being used during these and raiding has resulted in loss of thousands of cattle, loss of lives, and destruction of property. It is causing fear, panic and a sense of insecurity among the wider population of South Sudan.

The common motivations for raiding cattle as mentioned by the youth range from wealth accumulation, pride, show of power against weaker tribes, revenge and the customary fulfilment of the high dowry demands. Revenge killings also happen as a result of cattle-raiding.

²⁰ This is a classification that many interlocutors from government and civil society gave to the teams, especially in Warrap State. Naturally, the diaspora also includes further countries, as Southsudanese were scattered all over the world. However, this categorization captures the main groups, according to interlocutors in the field.

The youth are seen to be actively involved in such violent raids. In most cases, they are being encouraged and supported by local leaders, chiefs, politicians or SPLA commanders, all having some sort of direct influence over unemployed youth.

- II. **Girl elopement:** The second most often mentioned form of conflict is the elopements of girls, which is a practice by youth to “hijack” girls for marriage. Given the economic hardships and widespread poverty in the country, the majority of the youth may not be able to afford the high bride price hence the temptation to elopement.

The nature of some marriages, notably according to some Dinka customs where candidates are “bidding” for the girl’s hand and the highest bidder “wins” the girl, makes the youth feel threatened of being outcompeted during the process. Instead they might resort to elopement and choose to negotiate with the girl’s parents later. This has resulted in violent attacks especially if the girl’s family is not ready and willing to let their girl get married to a family whose son has eloped their girl.

One practical implication of girl elopement is the potential loss of economic value of the women, as a girl who gets impregnated before being married and therefore before her parents have received the dowry usually “loses” value in terms of the bride price. A woman’s bride price that would be at 300 cows, for instance, could then be reduced to “only” 30 cows. Naturally the women’s family will not appreciate this and animosities can develop against the young man, which might result in fighting between the families as well as revenge killings.

- III. **Armed conflicts:** Also dominant among the responses received from youth are the armed conflicts in South Sudan such as the fight between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and armed civilians (the Arrow Boys) in Western Equatoria, between the various rebel movements in South Sudan and SPLA, between members of the Murle tribe and the Lou Nuer / Dinka in Jonglei, between specific tribes in Eastern Equatoria as well as in Upper Nile and to a lesser extend in Central Equatoria State. Conflicts between Murle and Lou Nuer / Dinka are not only increasing in numbers of mobilised tribesmen and casualties, but have also been repetitive in nature with cycles of revenge attacks.

- IV. **Child abduction:** The Murle tribe is reported to be involved in child and women abductions, and, to a lesser extent, Dinka and Lou Nuer of Jonglei as well. Explanations were given that members of the Murle tribe do not produce enough children due to diseases affecting their ability to produce biologically (unconfirmed claim). Therefore, it was reasoned, the fear of their communities getting extinct led them to forcefully abduct children and women so as to preserve their ethnicity. In addition, abducted children have economic value as they can be sold for 30-50 cows each, making it a lucrative business.

However, it should be noted that there is a lack of clarity about the issue of child abduction, and participants of the project workshop in March 2012 agreed that stereotypes are indeed shaping perceptions. Child abduction, it was clarified, is only being practiced by parts of the Murle tribe and it has happened also among the Lou Nuer in Jonglei State and between the Dinka in Lakes State during the civil war.

V. **Grazing land/water points/border or land disputes:** Conflicts over grazing land and water points among the pastoralist, as well as border or land disputes are being experienced in almost all the ten states of South Sudan. The conflict between the Acholi and Madi tribes and among the Lopit community over Lopa as their headquarter in Eastern Equatoria State, the land conflict between the Shilluk, Dinka and Nuer in Upper Nile, Ngagilio and Tambura in Western Equatoria and the Misseriya who are often seen crossing the border from Sudan to Northern Bahr al Ghazal in search for water and grazing land are some of the examples mentioned by the youth. There is also bad blood between pastoralists and crop growers, as pastoralists are often accused by crop growers of letting their cattle graze on their farmlands and destroy their crops, which is mainly happening during the dry season along the river banks.

The destruction of crops has direct impact on the survival of the people, as it has often resulted in inter- and intra-communal fighting and some crop growers (mainly in the Equatoria) have lost the morale for farming. This partly explains the high cost of goods in the markets since most food crops are being imported from the neighbouring countries.

VI. **Intra-/ Intertribal conflicts:** The main actors were reported to be the youth either on their own or with influence from local leadership and at times key government officials. The lack of organization by the youth explains why they are easily being lured into causing insecurity which has far-reaching consequences, the population remaining in fear due to insecurity. This has a direct impact on the overall daily fulfilment of the people's aspirations.

The youth in their varied responses observed that violent conflicts have devastating effects on South Sudanese communities, and further expressed that in case these conflicts are not addressed, South Sudan will continue to experience poverty which will likely lead to increased insecurity. In their views, if this is the course taken there will be an increased cycle of revenge since communities will have no option but to take the law into their hands, a rather undesirable situation for the newly independent South Sudan.

b) Views on the way forward

In their responses, the youth unanimously advised that the current conflict trends require local solutions. They expressed the importance of holding youth to youth discussions and the need for open dialogue among the communities as the best way to ending or managing the cycle of conflict currently experienced in South Sudan.

Interviewees expressed their readiness and willingness to becoming involved in dialogue processes since no meaningful change can be achieved without the youth, the backbone of the country²¹. Indeed, given the intractable nature of some of these conflicts there is urgent need for sincere, meaningful dialogue if peace is to be realized and sustained. According to the youth, effective programmes for dialogue should include youth participants whose views are disseminated for possible actions to stakeholders from churches, community leaders, fellow youth, government officials and politicians from cattle raiding communities as well as to peace promoting NGOs and to the international community.

²¹ 72% of the country's population is below the age of 30, according to a 2009 assessment. See South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (2009). *Key Indicators for South Sudan*. Retrieved April 2012, from: http://ssnbs.org/storage/key-indicators-for-southern-sudan/Key%20Indicators_A5_final.pdf.

Youth expressed the need for vocational and adult literacy schools to train youth in various skills for employment activities. This would keep the youth away from temptations of being lured into subversive activities that have disastrous consequences on the life of the citizens. Respondents further considered the creation of effective channels of communications between youth and authorities, which would avoid miscommunication, heal the mistrust among the communities and create awareness. Finally, the government is urged to decisively address the security concerns, to disarm civilians, and to create equal employment opportunities.

c) *Overview of conflict types state by state*

State	Conflict types
Eastern Equatoria	Cattle raiding, robbery, land disputes, inter-tribal/ intra-tribal conflicts, grazing land and water resources, high bride price.
Central Equatoria	Cattle raiding, robbery, land grabbing, inter-tribal conflicts.
Western Equatoria	Lynching, robbery, inter-tribal conflict, Lord's Resistance Army, land disputes.
Jonglei	Cattle raiding, child and women abduction, rebel attacks, grazing land, water resources and high bride price.
Upper Nile	Rebel attacks, land dispute, cattle raiding, inter-tribal conflcits.
Lakes	Cattle raiding, land dispute, high dowry, inter-tribal conflict, tribalism.
Western Bahr al Ghazal	Inter-tribal conflict, lynching, robbery.
Warrap	Cattle raiding, high dowry, water resources, inter-tribal conflict.
Northern Bahr al Ghazal	Cattle raiding, land conflicts, nepotism, border conflict.

5. *Further challenges mentioned by interviewees*

a) *General trends*

The most frequently mentioned challenges by the interviewed youth across all of the nine states were insecurity and unemployment. Lack of infrastructure, often meaning poor condition of roads, and food security are also considered main issues by the youth. Corruption, nepotism and lack of water and grazing land were listed by some of the youth, but mentioned in less than half of the states. Challenges including lack of education, availability of small arms, harmful customary traditions, gender equality, commodity availability and prices, lack of rule of law, tribalism, lack of organisation among youth and witchcraft were mentioned in one or two states by the youth.

As key national-level challenges the interviewees identified insecurity resulting mainly from intra-/intertribal conflicts and low levels of infrastructural development. The issue of intra-/intertribal conflict has been elaborated upon in the precedent chapter, yet the link to politics is important to note as position holders were seen to be fuelling insecurity by inciting youth.

It was the researchers impression that dowry and marriage was a concern shared by all youth, while more educated and urban youth seemed to see alternatives of how to deal with the situation whereas youth in rural areas may resort to cattle-raiding more easily. The interviewees were emphasizing vocational training and scholarships for higher education as main concerns. While Southsudanese youth view their government as the primary source of education, jobs and hope, the government of South Sudan does not appear poised to provide substantial support to vital youth priorities related to dowry, employment,

education, and training. The chapter on M&E will shed light on the views with regard to trust in the government, which, as it will be shown, is very low.

b) Dynamics per state

Lakes State: Communities alone cannot address the challenges, as corruption for instance was seen to be deeply rooted in the government structure. Some youth mentioned that international pressure would help to address this issue. Government intervention was seen to be required to tackle the lack of education by opening vocational training centres, for instance. Furthermore, disarmament has been conducted several times by the government; the attempt in 2006 resulted in a fight between the SPLA and civilians. The government tried again in July 2011 and President Salva Kiir Mayardit himself issued a strong warning that anyone who would resist would be faced by law.

Warrap: The youth viewed that communities should be engaged in addressing the general insecurity in the state. In some cases the communities may not be in a position to address all the concerns, some challenges may be beyond their capacity - therefore the state level authorities should be involved in finding solutions to reducing problems of insecurity.

Western Bahr el Ghazal: Youth were of the opinion that the government, international NGOs and the Ministry of Education should establish vocational training institutions to promote employment. This was a particular concern in this state, and youth mentioned that the majority of the public schools had been Islamized before the CPA due to the proximity to the North, with the result that many schools were Arabic pattern (with exception of Church schools). It was felt that being able to communicate in English, the official language in South Sudan since independence, was important to the interviewees.

Northern Bahr el Ghazal: Youth were of the view that the government of South Sudan should be making efforts to address the issue of national border demarcation with the Khartoum government. Given the proximity of Northern Bahr el Ghazal with the northern state of South Darfur, Arab nomadic tribes are migrating south during the dry season, and youth felt that the government should address this issue.

Eastern Equatoria: Many youth were concerned about rising dowry prices and an inability to meet these, hoping that the government would take action. Without any employment opportunities there is the risk of an increasing number of male youth ending up enlisting in militias and joining cattle raids. Therefore the government must find ways to downsize dowry levels, protect female youth and support orphan youth, in addition to expanding quality education, job training, and English language training.

Jonglei: According to the youth, the government should improve the infrastructure, particularly roads, in the whole state. International NGOs were urged to support the government in promoting education, road construction, health services, food security and in improving the access to water.

Upper Nile: It was viewed that most of the challenges need government intervention, yet the public should be sensitized and youth should organize themselves to air their concerns. Anti-corruption efforts in South Sudan have not had a proper impact, thus civil society should be the one to address this issue in workshops and conferences.

Western Equatoria: Lack of employment, insecurity and proliferation of small arms were particularly mentioned in this state, and the state government was viewed to be the one to solve such issues. Traditional leaders should be empowered to help resolving some of the disputes.

Central Equatoria: According to the interviewees, the government should address youth unemployment and build vocational training centres. The absence of rule of law should equally be addressed by the government. Corruption was seen as endemic in South Sudan and civil society actors should discuss this issue alongside nepotism and tribalism which are affecting the lives of all people in the country.

State	Main challenges
Eastern Equatoria	Unemployment, customary traditions (marriage, rising dowry prizes), nepotism, lack of trust between returnees and citizens who stayed in the country during the civil war, women seen as property (gender challenge), gang activities, government does not listen to the youth concerns.
Central Equatoria	Unemployment, lack of rule of law, insecurity (crimes), nepotism.
Western Equatoria	Insecurity (confrontations between farmers and cattle keepers), corruption, lack of organisation among youth, proliferation of small arms, unemployment, witchcraft.
Jonglei	Insecurity (cattle raiding, land and border-disputes), lack of rule of law, lack of infrastructure (especially roads), food security, lack of water and grazing land.
Upper Nile	Lack of infrastructure, corruption, nepotism, tribalism (Dinka domination) unemployment, food security, availability of commodities, lack of transparency in recruitment processes.
Lakes	Insecurity (cattle raiding), unemployment, high commodity prices, food security, lack of infrastructure, customary traditions (marriage, dowry of 100 to 250 cows), proliferation of small arms, gender issues.
Western Bahr al Ghazal	Insecurity, unemployment, high commodity prices (border to North closed and rising prices due to poor roads), lack of infrastructure, lack of education opportunities.
Warrap	Insecurity (cattle raiding and mass movement of Misseriya nomads into Twic which sometimes results in clashes with the SPLA), unemployment, lack of development, education, food security, lack of grazing land and water for cattle, floods, outbreak of diseases.
Northern Bahr al Ghazal	Insecurity (border conflict with Arab Bagar and Misseriya, incomplete demarcation of North-South border), corruption, lack of water and grazing land (conflicting with nomads from the North).

c) *National prioritization exercise*

During the project workshop in March 2012, a so-called "prioritization exercise" was conducted with the youth on the challenges mentioned. This type of tool uses a rating-technique in order to establish priorities among different items. Although all of the identified types of challenges can arguably be defined as priority in South Sudan, this exercise allowed the test group to have a first dialogue on priority areas for state-building in the Republic of South Sudan and, for the dialogue process, to test and fine-tune the use of the tool.

In a first step, the youth voted to identify five most crucial challenges among the above-mentioned elements as well as further ones discussed in the March workshop, resulting in the following list:

- Insecurity
- Unemployment
- Lack of infrastructure and services
- Corruption
- Lack of rule of law

Subsequently, the participants voted to establish a rating among these elements upon which action should be taken. The following order of priorities was established:

1. Lack of infrastructure and services
2. Lack of rule of law
3. Insecurity
4. Corruption
5. Unemployment

It is interesting to see that a need to improve on infrastructure and services was rated first by the participants. In the views of the youth roads, telecommunication as well as hospitals and schools are of prime importance for South Sudan in order to improve accessibility, treatment of diseases as well as the level of education. These basic developmental challenges crucially need to be addressed as road accessibility, for instance, would also improve the possibilities for traders to deliver goods and reduce transportation costs. In addition, improved accessibility is a necessity for economic development and investment, and it would further reduce conflict as police and security forces could better provide security in remote areas.

Lack of rule of law was ranked second by the youth, and a latent threat of unlawful practice or of being treated unlawfully has an impact on the democratic development of the country. If the perpetrators of crimes are not judged in a fair justice system impunity becomes a challenge. This may lead to mob violence, which in turn increases the feeling of insecurity within the society.

Insecurity resulting from all sorts of incidents ranging from cattle-raiding, internal rebellions and girl elopement²², is a strong concern to the youth and was ranked third. It prevents the population from fulfilling their daily aspirations, it prevents farmers from growing crops and children from going to school. Widespread availability of small arms, despite disarmament efforts conducted by the government and assisted by the international community, add to the level of severity of violence. Affected individuals remain in psychological distress fearing attacks, revenge and more violence.

Corruption was mentioned fourth, and the discussion with the youth revealed that in their view corruption was oftentimes close to the issues of nepotism and tribalism. Embezzlement of state funds, politicians using their decision-making power for their own benefit, not being able to access government jobs due to tribal differences or because government officials employed family members - these were all concerns that were linked to poor government performance.

Unemployment, ranked last, was an important concern, given high unemployment among youth in South Sudan. Not exercising a job precludes the possibility of youth to cater for themselves, sustain their families and build their future. The non-existence of a functioning economy is a legacy of the long years of war, which hampered the development of any kind of economic entrepreneurship. The prime employment sectors in South Sudan are the government as well as UN or international NGOs, yet a private economy still needs to develop in order to significantly increase employment levels. In order for this to happen, however, other identified priority areas need to be addressed, too: Insecurity and infrastructure are a pre-requisite for investors and businesspeople to invest significantly in the country, and questions of corruption, rule of law and an educated workforce need to be addressed, too.

²² Please refer to chapter 5 for a more thorough account of the conflicts mentioned by the interviewees.

6. Monitoring and evaluation baseline assessment

The purpose of monitoring and evaluation for this project is to gauge, at certain points before, throughout and after the implementation of the dialogue process, the levels of the core indicators on which this project seeks to intervene:

- Increasing confidence between and among youth across South Sudan
- Deepening youth participation in and ownership of relevant political and non-political processes
- Increasing confidence between youth and state representatives

To gather baseline data on these indicators the project team developed a set of questions (see Annex A), which produced quantitative data that can easily be analysed and measured against data gathered at a later point to assess possible change. Indeed, categories such as “confidence” and “trust” that have been enquired here are intrinsically subjective as they are about perceptions and based on personal experiences, but individual attitudes represent social realities which drive collective dynamics, including conflicts.

During the interviews, the teams enquired about perceived level of interaction among youth from different tribes (*how much* interaction is there?), the interviewee’s characterization of typical interaction among the youth from different tribes (*how* is the interaction?), perceptions on the level of confidence and trust among youth, as well as between youth and local/national government. In addition, views on the level of violence among youth in the respondent’s state were gathered as well as perceptions on participation of youth in political processes. The answers to these questions were aggregated in charts and an analysis is provided below.


a) Perceived level of interaction among youth from different tribes

To put the question of confidence between youth from different tribes into perspective it is first important to know what the (perceived) level of interaction actually is to better understand the actual exposure which is crucial for inter-communal understanding. Taken all responses from the nine states as a whole, there is a rough split of 52% of positive views (“good” and “sufficient”) versus 48% of negative views (“never” and “poor”) on the level of interaction of youth from different tribes. A notable majority of respondents (42%) has however deemed the level of interaction as “poor”, which is a quite high percentage, while only 32% have noted a “good” level of interaction. An explanation for the limited interaction between youth from different tribes might be stereotypes and prevalence of tribalism, as was explained by participants of the youth workshop in March 2012. This might have a historical dimension to it as well, as Southsudanese joined the struggle alongside their tribe. In addition, lack of opportunities to get together and to travel were mentioned by youth as reason for a lack of interaction.

Interesting variations appear when looking at the data for the different states. While Eastern Equatoria State is inhabited by a number of different tribes, this state had the highest percentage (30%) of respondents who viewed that youth from different tribes would “never” interact with each other, and another 30% talked of “poor” interaction, bringing the total level of negative views in Eastern Equatoria to 60%. Central Equatoria State is equally remarkable for the high percentage of respondents viewing a “poor” level of interaction (60%) among youth from different tribes of South Sudan, which is equally notable given the high number of different tribes in this state which is also home to Juba, the Southsudanese capital and probably the most ethnically diverse town in South Sudan. This seems to suggest that although the

potential for exposure is given, youth seem to rather socialize with peers from their tribes and to live in areas inhabited by their own communities. The highest percentage of negative views ("poor" and "never"), however, was found in the States of Upper Nile, Lakes and Jonglei, with 77%, around 64% and 58%, respectively. The presence of rivaling dominant tribes, i.e Dinka, Luo Nuer and Murle in Jonglei, or Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer in Upper Nile perhaps explains this highest percentage of views of poor and non-existent levels of interaction among the youth, as these tribes each have a bloody history of clashes and counter attacks against each other. On the other end of the spectrum lie the states of Western Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, with a quite high percentage of positive responses. Taking the options "good" and "sufficient" together, the levels reach 73% for Western Equatoria and 87% for Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

The question on the level of interaction between youth from different tribes does not take into account variations in possibilities of exposure to other tribes, as some states like Warrap and Lakes are inhabited mainly by one ethnic group, and the lack of exposure does in fact limit the likelihood for interaction with youth from different tribes. In addition, the quantitative data gathered from the answers does not shed light on the reason why there might be a lack of interaction. However, as interaction and exposure is a predisposition to understanding other tribes and to building up trust and confidence the question still provides interesting insights, particularly when taken together with the following question - while this question was asking about the level of interaction (i.e. *how much* interaction is there), the following one is asking for the complementary information of how respondents characterize interaction between youth from different tribes (i.e. *how* is the interaction).




b) Characterizing typical interaction among the youth from different tribes

In general, the great majority of respondents (56%) perceived the interaction among youth from different tribes in their area as being "both negative and positive", followed by an assessment by 28% of the interviewees that interaction was "mostly positive".

Interesting differences appear when comparing results per state. The areas with the highest percentages of views of positive interaction were found in the States of Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (all 40%), as well as Western Bahr el Ghazal (33%). Again in Eastern Equatoria was the percentage highest with negative views (30%), which might be related to confrontations that started between the Madi and Acholi while interviews were conducted. Upper Nile State had also quite a high

percentage of negative views (23%) on interaction between youth from different tribes and at the same time held a lowest number of positive views (8%). The scores were similar for Jonglei State, with 17% views of interaction being negative as well as around 8% of positive interaction, likely to be related to recurrent intertribal conflicts between Murle, Lou Nuer and Dinka.



c) Perception on the level of confidence and trust


As this project aims at improving confidence between youth on the one hand but also with the government interlocutors by trying to make sure that their views find resonance at the political level, this baseline assessment tried to gauge the state of trust among youth and these actors.

Overall, the level of confidence and trust *between youth* was deemed positive ("sufficient and "good") by 62% of the respondents from the nine states, while 38% had a negative assessment of the situation ("poor" and "non-existent"). This being said, when looking at the data in more detail the majority (35%) of the respondents thought there is a "good" deal of confidence and trust between youth.

When looking at the state-level data, the chart below shows that there is quite a high level of confidence between youth in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, as 100% of the respondents have either answered that there is a "good" (47%) level of confidence or a "sufficient" (53%) level. This is a remarkable finding which might be linked to the context when the interviews were conducted, as the Bahr el Ghazal Youth conference²³ was held during this time, contributing to a positive feeling amongst youth of striving to build something new and to organize themselves. Apart from Northern Bahr el Ghazal the states of Western Equatoria, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes also saw a quite high percentage of positive answers to this question (taken "good" and "sufficient" together), roughly surrounding the 70% in each state. In contrast to that, the situation is reverse in Central Equatoria, Upper Nile and Jonglei States, with 60-70% of the interviewees responding in the negative, taking "poor" and "non-existent" together. Looking more precisely at this category it becomes not only obvious that Upper Nile State is the area with the highest

²³ bringing together youth from the entire region, i.e. Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes States.


percentage of negative answers (69%) but it also represents the state with the highest percentage of respondents claiming confidence and trust was “non-existent” among youth (31%).



Asking the question of confidence and trust between youth and *local government* reveals that the general level is much lower compared to trust among youth. In total, 57% of the respondents answered in the negative (adding up “poor” and “non-existent”), while 43% answered positively (“good” and “sufficient”). However, a more precise look discloses that a great majority of respondents (44%) greatly lacked faith in their local government, deeming the confidence and trust between youth and local government to be “poor”.


Two states, however, are apart here: Warrap is the only state where no one viewed as “non-existent” the confidence between youth and local government, and with 80% it also has the highest percentage of positive responses (adding up “good” and “sufficient”) to this question, which is quite remarkable. With a total of 67% of positive responses, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State is following closely, and the more detailed data for this state show that 33% see the confidence and trust between youth and local government as actually “good”. Youth explained that Warrap State governor Nyadeng Malek, a women, is well respected. For Northern Bahr el Ghazal, youth equally explained that governor Paul Malong is acknowledging the youth and seeks to be close to them.

On the other end of the spectrum there is a series of states where respondents held quite negative view (“poor” and “non-existent”) on the level of confidence and trust, i.e. 60% in Western Equatoria and 62% in Upper Nile State, but going up to 80-83% in Central Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal as well as Lakes State. Interestingly, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria States both did not have any respondents characterizing trust with the local government as “good”. Different local governance dynamics feed into these negative views, and as was seen in previous chapters youth aired their frustration about nepotism, corruption and lack of employment. After the county level the state government is the closest to them and issues arising at that level are those that are more directly affecting the youth awareness of what is happening might be higher here as well.



Coming to the question of confidence and trust between youth and the *national, Juba-based government*, 63% of the interviewees held negative views (“poor” and “non-existent”), which is 5% more negative than trust in the local government as seen before (57%). The youth and the general population had high expectations on the government which unfortunately could not be turned to reality. This was worsened by the untimely death of the late Dr. John Garang, as the youth had full confidence in his leadership style and abilities. Only 37% assessed there was a positive (“sufficient” or “good”) level of trust and confidence.


It is striking to see that 100% of the respondents in Central Equatoria held negative views, 40% claiming confidence being “non-existent” and 60% claiming it was “poor”. For Central Equatoria the interviews had been conducted in Juba, and the above findings seem to suggest that those interviewees closest to the national government are the most frustrated with it, and participants of the youth workshop in March 2012 explained that youth in Juba hold more negative views as they see how resources are being spent in the capital. Western Equatoria follows closely in this line, with only 13% of the interviewees responding positively (“good” or “sufficient”) and 87% negatively (“non-existent” and “poor”). The data for Western Bahr el Ghazal is similar, with 75% responding negatively. In contrast, the highest percentage of positive replies were received in Eastern Equatoria State, and from the total of 70% of positive replies 20% claimed the confidence and trust was “good” and 50% as “sufficient”. In the remaining states positive views were around 40-50%, the highest percentage of views of a “good” level of confidence and trust being found in the States of Warrap (40%) and Jonglei (33%).



e) *Views on the level of violence of youth in the respondent's state*

Overall, 33% of the interviewees found that youth in their state were very or quite violent, and an additional 56% found their peers were violent at some degree. Only a minority of 11% found that youth were “not at all violent”, a concerning finding.

The respondent’s views on the level of violence among youth is varying widely from state to state, but it is clear that in none of the states did the youth characterize their peers 100% as “not at all violent” – the only notable exception was Northern Bahr el Ghazal, where 60% of the respondents found that youth in their state were not at all violent. However, a high level of violence (adding up percentages for “quite violent” and “very violent”) was perceived among youth in the following states: Eastern Equatoria (90%), Jonglei (67%), Upper Nile (54%), Central Equatoria (50%) and Warrap (40%). Violence was perceived to be still present but at a rather intermediary level (“to some degree”), in particular in Western Equatoria (100%), Western Bahr el Ghazal (83%) and Lakes State (82%). The high percentage in Eastern Equatoria is certainly linked to the recent clashes between Madi and Acholi. The finding for Western Equatoria is quite telling, particularly since the Arrow Boys who are fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are made up of organized youth, but despite this it seems respondents still perceived just a limited level of violence (including an Arrow Boy that was interviewed). Youth at the March 2012 workshop explained that the Arrow Boys are considered to be taking care of defence and protection, and in this light not being considered as violent.




f) *Participation of youth in political processes*

The vast majority of youth (63%) viewed that they were participating in political processes to a rather high level (“very active” and “quite active”), only 33% viewed a limited contribution and a mere 4% saw that youth did not contribute at all to political processes.

It is quite notable that in most states 60%-80% of the respondents held positive views (“very active” and “quite active”) with the exceptions of Upper Nile, Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria States where more respondents saw only limited or no contribution at all to political processes. With 65%, respondents in Northern Bahr el Ghazal held the highest percentage of views of youth being very actively contributing, a quite remarkable figure which, again, might probably be related to the occasion of the Bahr el Ghazal Youth conference which was held in Aweil when our researchers were conducting interviews in this town, as it is testimony of a wish for the views of the youth to be better heard. A closer look is also revealing for the

situation in Central Equatoria, where responses are a bit more polarized with 50% viewing youth as contributing “very actively” to political processes whereas the remaining 50% rather view their contribution as “limited”. The proximity to politics and government in Central Equatoria might have contributed to a high percentage of positive views, but possible frustration with the way how politics are being made in Juba might have prompted negative views.



g) Overall discussion

Keeping in mind that the aim of this exercise was not to provide thorough opinion polling but rather a snapshot of the actual views of interviewees, general conclusions for the youth of South Sudan cannot be drawn easily but it still provides an insightful portrait of the interviewees, which helps to measure the state of play of this project’s areas of intervention.

One aspect this project seeks to intervene on is to *increase confidence between and among youth across South Sudan*. It was shown that there was a rough equal split of positive and negative views of the youth’s perceptions of the level of interaction between youth from different tribes. Notably, respondents in Central Equatoria State widely noted a poor level of interaction, suggesting the tribes live apart in the country’s capital. Regarding *how* youth would characterize interaction, it was seen that more than half of the respondents perceived the interaction among youth from different tribes in their area as being “both negative and positive”, followed by an assessment by one third of the interviewees that interaction was “mostly positive”. In addition, the level of confidence and trust *between youth* was deemed positive by more than half (62%) of the respondents from the nine states, while 38% had a negative assessment of the situation. The responses also show that 89% of the interviewees viewed that youth were violent at varying degrees, only a minority of 11% found that youth were not at all violent. Given these results, the score on youth interaction is mixed at best and further action is necessary.

Increasing confidence between youth and state representatives is a further area this project seeks to intervene on, and it was shown this is badly needed: The general level of confidence and trust between youth and *local government* is quite low as overall more than half (57%) of the respondents answered in the negative, while 43% answered positively. Warrap, however, is the only state where no one viewed as

non-existent the confidence between youth and local government, and with 80% it also received the highest percentage of positive responses. Northern Bahr el Ghazal State received similar high scores for this question. The great majority of respondents (63%) held negative views on the level of confidence and trust between youth and the *national government*, an even more negative score than trust in the local government. Only 37% assessed that there was a positive level of trust and confidence, scores that indicate a deep mistrust towards the government to deliver on their promises.

Deepening youth participation in and ownership of relevant political and non-political processes is a last area of intervention. It was shown that the vast majority of youth viewed that they were participating in political processes to a rather high level (“very active” and “quite active”), only one third viewed a limited contribution and a mere 4% saw that youth did not contribute at all to political processes. This is a surprisingly positive score given the rather low results regarding trust and confidence in the government. Mistrust in government will ultimately have an impact on the level of participation in political processes, as youth confirmed in the project workshop in March 2012.

Conclusion

During the pre-assessment field research for the joint CMI-CPDS-ONAD project on "youth-dialogue on confidence and state-building" the teams conducted interviews with various youth across nine states of South Sudan. The four aims of the research were achieved, i.e. a) to identify potential participants; b) to identify the issues related to challenges and conflicts in order to inform agenda-setting for the workshops; c) to establish contacts with government officials and local actors and to introduce them to the project and d) to draw up an M&E baseline assessment.

It was found that there is a great variety of organization among youth across South Sudan, involving youth associations, civil society organizations focusing on youth, sports and theatre groups, regional formations, groups monitoring government activities, more traditional societal groups, and many more. The level of youth organization varies from state to state and from tribe to tribe, but there is a great richness of youth activity.

108 individuals were interviewed, representing 27 different tribal groups and aged 17 to 39. Unfortunately only one fifth of the interviewees were female, despite the researchers' efforts to reach out to active young women. Most of the youth encountered had either a diaspora background or returned from north Sudan after the civil war, and nearly all had received at least secondary education or were university students/graduates.

The interviewed youth were deeply concerned by violence affecting their home areas, including incidents of cattle raiding, girl elopement, armed conflicts, child abduction, conflicts over grazing land, water points, over border or land, as well as intra- and intertribal conflicts. To address these, youth identified a need for local solutions, to hold discussions and dialogue among the communities. Apart from incidents of violence, youth mentioned challenges such as lack of infrastructure and services, absence of rule of law, insecurity, corruption and unemployment as national-level priorities that need urgent remedy.

The teams also obtained key insights from the M&E aspect of this field assessment. More concretely, one third of the respondents viewed the interaction among youth as positive, while the trust and confidence between youth was deemed positive by two thirds of them. However, close to 90% assessed that the youth were violent at varying degrees, only a minority found youth not to be violent at all. The confidence and trust in government is quite low in general, the local government faring just a little better than the national government, frustration being quite high in general. Youth found that their participation in politics was quite high for the time being, but also confirmed that mistrust in government is likely to ultimately have a negative impact on political participation.

In this pre-assessment research phase interviews were conducted in state capitals and the findings has prompted the project team to expand the activities to more rural areas across South Sudan. Membership of the project's dialogue core group will be extended beyond these arguably privileged youth to include youth who are closer to the conflict dynamics, who are affected by them or even involved²⁴. More efforts will be put into reaching female youth and the overall membership shall achieve a core group that is reflective of the diversity of youth in South Sudan.

²⁴ At the time of finalizing this report interviews were being conducted in rural areas.

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Annex 1: Interview Questionnaire

*University of Juba
Centre for Peace and Development Studies*

Pre-assessment questionnaire

Please attach one questionnaire sheet to each of the interview notes

Team: _____

Date: ___ / ___ / 2011

Town: _____ / State: _____

Short introduction about the project partners:

- The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is a Finnish NGO that works to resolve conflict and build sustainable peace
- It was founded in 2000 by its chairman, Peace Nobel Laureate Martti Ahtisaari and is based in Finland
- CMI works in many places, for instance in West Africa, with the African Union, and the Middle East
- The Centre for Peace and Development Studies at University of Juba promotes philosophies that aim at integrating humanitarian, conflict and peace studies with other relevant academic programmes
- It acts as an academic research entity that offers post-graduate level degrees
- The Centre also offers capacity building for public services

Project description:

- CPDS and CMI work together on a project on "youth dialogue on confidence and state building"
- This project aims at facilitating youth dialogue in all 10 States of South Sudan and at regional level
- These dialogues will be conducted with a view to creating confidence among youth
- This means that they will elaborate proposals to addressing conflicts in South Sudan
- These proposals will be linked to ongoing political processes at state and national level
- In this way, the project will contribute to the stability of the new country and reduce violence

1. Background information about the interviewee:

Name: _____ Age: _____ Gender: M / F Ethnic group: _____

Phone number(s): _____ Email address: _____

Member of a political party: no SPLM other (specify): _____

Member of the Diaspora: Yes No Returnee from the North: Yes No IDP: Yes No

Languages spoken: English Arabic other (specify): _____

Level of education: Primary school Secondary school Higher education

Youth group and position: _____ Current job: _____

2. Assessment of the current situation in South Sudan

- A. How do you assess the current situation in South Sudan?
- B. What are the main challenges confronting South Sudan and its people, at local and national levels?
- C. What can be done to address these challenges?
- D. What can you or your community do to address these?

3. Focus on conflict dynamics:

- A. What sorts of incidents of violence, or threats of violence, are the most recurrent in your area?
- B. How does the violence, or threat of violence, affect the ability of citizens to fulfill their aspirations?
- C. What can be done about these incidents of violence and threats?
- D. Do you think South Sudan will be a peaceful and prosperous country in the future??

4. The interviewee's role and attitudes:

- A. Are you active with youth and if so, how?
- B. Do you see a use for youth to discuss issues confronting South Sudan in broader venues, e.g. at state/regional/national levels?
- C. Is it useful for youth to share views with decision-makers and politicians?
- D. Would you be interested to engage in a long term dialogue aimed at finding a peaceful future for South Sudan?
- E. Do you know other youth who would be interested in such a process?
- F. Would you be interested in facilitating, promoting and communicating about such a dialogue, e.g. through videotaping or talking to the government and the international community?

5. Monitoring and Evaluation questions:

- A. What is the level of interaction among the youth from different tribes (means: *how much* interaction is there)?

0 – Never	<input type="checkbox"/>
1 – Poor	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 – Sufficient	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 – Good	<input type="checkbox"/>

- B. How do you characterize typical interaction among the youth from different tribes (means: *how is the interaction*)?

1 – Mostly negative	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 – Both negative and positive	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 – Mostly positive	<input type="checkbox"/>

- C. What is your perception on the confidence and trust a) among youth; b) between youth and local government; c) between youth and national government in Juba?

Confidence and trust	a) amongst youth	b) between youth and local government	c) between youth and national government
0 – Non-existent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1 – Poor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 – Sufficient	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 – Good	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- D. How violent are the youth in your state?

0 – Not at all violent	<input type="checkbox"/>
1 – Violent at some degree	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 – Quite violent	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 – Very violent	<input type="checkbox"/>

- E. How actively do the youth contribute to political processes?

0 – No contribution at all	<input type="checkbox"/>
1 – Limited contribution	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 – Quite active	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 – Very active	<input type="checkbox"/>